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ORGANIZATIONAL FORM AS STATUS AND SIGNAL 
Kimberly D. Krawiec* 
In this Article, the author analyzes the reactions of 147 New 
York City law firms to the 1994 enactment of the New York 
Limited Liability Partnership statute, which provided New 
York law firm partners with the first convenient mechanism to 
limit their personal liability for partnership debts.  Using both 
quantitative and qualitative evidence, she evaluates whether 
the behavior of New York law firms supports the signaling 
theory of organizational form—that is, the theory that firms use 
the partnership form to signal to the marketplace that they 
provide high quality legal services, due to either superior 
monitoring or to profit sharing.  She concludes that the 
quantitative data do not strongly support either signaling 
theory of partnership.  In addition, both theories face 
substantial theoretical hurdles. 
At the same time, interviews with law firm partners suggest 
that signaling concerns did impact law firm choice of form, in 
some cases profoundly.  The author proposes three 
modifications to the signaling theory of organizational form 
that render the theory both more theoretically persuasive and 
more consistent with the observed behavior of law firms.  First, 
the relevant signal appears to be negative, rather than positive.  
Second, this negative signal is more costly to elite firms than to 
non-elite firms.  Third, firms may attempt to signal something 
other than, or in addition to, quality through their choice of 
organizational form—namely, status. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1994, the New York state legislature provided law firms in 
the state with an alternative organizational form, the limited 
liability partnership (“LLP”), to the form that had been the standard 
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for centuries, the general partnership (“GP”).1  Law firms’ reactions 
to this development provide a rare opportunity for the empirical 
study, not only of the perceived costs and benefits of these 
organizational forms but also of the mechanisms by which firms 
choose to innovate and the mechanisms by which those innovations 
diffuse across an industry. 
In this Article, I discuss one factor that appears to have played 
a complicated role both in firm decisions about organizational form 
and in dictating the mechanisms by which the new organizational 
form spread throughout New York law firms—the potential signal 
imparted by each firm’s choice of organizational form.  The signaling 
theory of partnership is not new.  Indeed, several variations of the 
theory appear in the economic literature on choice of form.  The role 
of signaling in organizational form is complicated, however, because 
the typical empirical measures of the signaling theory of partnership 
do not support the conclusion that attempts to signal quality to the 
marketplace impact New York law firm choice of organizational 
form.2  At the same time, other evidence—particularly extensive 
interviews with a large number of partners at New York law firms 
involved in their firm’s choice of form decision—suggests that 
concerns over signaling did impact law firm decisions regarding 
whether to limit partner liability for partnership debts, perhaps 
quite strongly.3  I conclude that the choice of form pattern among 
New York law firms—along with evidence gleaned from the 
decision-makers themselves—suggests that signaling theories of 
partnership need modification if they are to contribute to our 
understanding of organizational form, at least with respect to law 
firms. 
Part II of this Article discusses the expansion of organizational 
forms available to professional service firms, from the simple GP 
form that had been the prevailing standard for centuries, to a 
multitude of choices, including the professional association (“PA”), 
the professional corporation (“PC”), the LLP, and the limited 
liability corporation (“LLC”).  Particular attention is given to the 
LLP, which has now spread to all fifty states. 
Part III sets out the empirical project, involving a dataset of 147 
law firms with more than twenty-five lawyers and their main offices 
in New York, New York (the “New York Data”).  Those empirical 
results are supplemented with interviews of three sets of individuals 
knowledgeable about and active in the debate over law firm choice of 
organizational form: New York law firm partners, law firm insurers, 
and law firm consultants.  Part III concludes by noting that the New 
York Data provide little, if any, empirical support for traditional 
 
 1. N.Y. P’SHIP LAW § 121-1500 (McKinney 1994). 
 2. See infra notes 16-56 and accompanying text (discussing the New York 
Data). 
 3. See infra notes 84-91 and accompanying text. 
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theories of partnership form, including theories based on unlimited 
liability, profit sharing, and illiquidity. 
Part IV describes two versions of the signaling theory of 
partnership: a monitoring signaling theory and a profit-sharing 
signaling theory.  Part IV then discusses the traditional measures 
employed to test those theories and demonstrates that the New York 
Data do not support signaling theories of partnership, at least as 
those theories are currently formulated. 
Part V urges a reformulation of signaling theories of 
partnership more consistent with the empirical data. First, the 
relevant signal appears to be negative, not positive.  Second, this 
negative signal is more costly to elite firms than to non-elite ones.  
Third, firms may be attempting to signal something other than, or 
in addition to, the provision of high-quality legal services—namely, 
high status.  Part VI concludes. 
II. THE EXPANSION OF ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS                                   
FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICE FIRMS 
Traditionally, professional service firms, including law firms, 
have been limited to a single organizational form—the GP.4  The 
rash of suits against law and other professional service firms in the 
wake of the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, however, caused 
professional firms to agitate for protection from personal liability for 
partnership debts.5  In 1991, the Texas state legislature granted 
their wish, and the LLP was born.6 
The only meaningful difference between the GP and LLP is that 
in the LLP, partners are liable only for partnership debts resulting 
from their own conduct or the conduct of someone under their 
supervision.7  This is in contrast to the GP, in which partners face 
 
 4. See, e.g., Jennifer J. Johnson, Limited Liability for Lawyers: General 
Partners Need Not Apply, 51 BUS. LAW. 85, 92-112 (1995) (discussing the 
availability of new organizational forms for law firms). 
 5. Robert W. Hamilton, Registered Limited Liability Partnerships: Present 
at the Birth (Nearly), 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 1065, 1069-71 (1995) (discussing the 
motivation for and the rise of the LLP statute in Texas). 
 6. Id. at 1065.  Another organizational form—the PC or PA, depending on 
the particular state statute—arose in the 1960s.  However, the purpose of the 
statute was primarily to provide law firms with favorable tax treatment 
relating to retirement benefits, rather than to shield partners from personal 
liability.  Accordingly, once tax changes removed the necessity of the form for 
tax benefits, the PC ceased to be a popular organizational choice in some 
jurisdictions.  See Johnson, supra note 4, at 92-102 & 92 n.28. 
 7. See ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN 
ON LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS, THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT, 
AND THE UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT (2001) § 1.04(a) (2003 ed.).  States 
differ in the limitations on liability provided by LLP status.  Some states limit 
liability for both contract and tort claims.  Id. at §§ 1.01(a)-(e), 2.08 (a)(1)-(2) 
(discussing the variations among state LLP statutes).  Other states limit 
liability only for specific types of tort claims.  Id. 
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full personal liability for all partnership debts.8 
Since the advent of the 1991 Texas statute, all fifty states have 
passed laws permitting professional service firms to organize as 
LLPs.9  This statutory change presents an important opportunity to 
study innovation and diffusion in general, and change with respect 
to organizational form in particular, because the transaction costs of 
the transformation are so low.  In New York, a professional service 
firm operating as a GP can become an LLP by filing a simple 
registration statement with the Secretary of State and paying a 
$200 filing fee.10  The old partnership agreement can continue to 
govern the relationship among the partners, obviating the need to 
draft a new partnership agreement.11 
Given the apparently minimal costs of switching to the LLP 
form and the benefits associated with avoiding personal liability, 
one might predict that in the ten-year interval since passage of New 
York’s LLP statute, nearly every New York law firm would have 
opted for the LLP form.  Furthermore, one might expect that, to the 
extent that some firms have failed to alter their organizational form, 
the failure might be most prevalent at small, less sophisticated 
firms, which perhaps have not taken the time to weigh the costs and 
benefits of switching. 
Neither of these predictions would be accurate.  In fact, a 
sizeable percentage of New York law firms—about 13 percent—
remain GPs.12  Moreover, some of America’s largest and most 
profitable law firms remain GPs as of the date of this study.13  
Finally, the majority of elite firms switched to the LLP form only 
after 2000, nearly six years after passage of the LLP statute.14  In 
this and a related Article, I examine empirically the factors that 
may contribute to this pattern of innovation and diffusion in 
organizational form.15 
III. THE EMPIRICAL PROJECT 
In 2004, Scott Baker and I collected data on the 147 law firms 
 
 8. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 13-15 (1914); REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 304, 306 
(2001). 
 9. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 7, § 1.01(e).  In addition, many 
states allow professional service firms, including law firms, to organize as 
LLCs.  Johnson, supra note 4, at 102-06. 
 10. See, e.g., N.Y. P’SHIP LAW § 121-1500 (McKinney 1997). 
 11. Id. § 121-1500(d). 
 12. Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Economics of Limited 
Liability: An Empirical Study of New York Law Firms, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 5) (discussing at length the results of an 
empirical study of the rate of adoption of the LLP form among New York law 
firms), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=622063. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. (manuscript at 29); see infra Chart 1 (demonstrating the filing rates 
of elite law firms as opposed to other law firms). 
 15. See generally Baker & Krawiec, supra note 12 (manuscript at 2-7). 
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listed in Martindale-Hubble and in the directory of the National 
Association of Law Placement (“NALP”) that have more than 
twenty-five lawyers and their main office in New York, New York.  
We supplemented that empirical analysis with extensive interviews 
of three sets of individuals knowledgeable about and involved in the 
debate regarding choice of organizational form among New York law 
firms: law firm partners, law firm consultants, and malpractice 
insurers.  Some of those results are published in The Economics of 
Limited Liability: An Empirical Study of New York Law Firms.16 
In brief, we conclude that the New York Data provide little, if 
any, empirical support for the traditional economic theories of 
partnership.  As discussed in this Article, however, these findings 
are troubling because interview data strongly suggest that concerns 
over organizational form as a signaling device did impact choice of 
form decisions by New York law firms, perhaps quite profoundly.  In 
this Part, I briefly describe the data collection process and interview 
methodology, and summarize the major results and conclusions to 
be drawn from the data. 
A. Data Collection 
The study was limited to New York law firms with more than 
twenty-five lawyers.17  The sample was restricted to law firms with 
more than twenty-five lawyers for a variety of reasons.  First, very 
small firms may differ from their larger counterparts in terms of 
culture, practice area, and the impact of various laws (such as state 
and local taxes) that may disproportionately affect small firms, 
rendering them poor subjects for the study.  In addition, very small 
firms may be more a collection of individuals who share office space 
and resources, but lack a common goal, history, or culture, again 
rendering them poor study subjects for these purposes.18 
Similarly, many reasons motivated the choice to restrict the 
sample to firms located in New York City.  This geographical 
 
 16. Baker & Krawiec, supra note 12, (manuscript at 20-63). 
 17. “New York law firms” are those firms whose main office is located in 
New York City.  A firm’s main office is located in New York City if, in March 
2004, the Martindale-Hubble Web site designated the New York City office as 
the “main office.”  If Martindale-Hubble listed more than one main office, the 
firm’s main office was considered to be in New York City, provided that at least 
one of the firm’s main offices was located in New York City.  All main office 
results were cross-checked against individual law firm Web sites.  If the firm’s 
Web site conflicted with the designation in Martindale-Hubble, the information 
from the firm’s Web site was used instead.  See Baker & Krawiec, supra note 
12, (manuscript at 24) (discussing the main office designation and cross-checks 
in more detail). 
 18. See Bruce M. Price, How Green Was My Valley?  An Examination of 
Tournament Theory As A Governance Mechanism in Silicon Valley Law Firms, 
37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 731, 741-42 (2003) (excluding law firms of fewer than 
eleven lawyers from an empirical study of Silicon Valley firms for similar 
reasons). 
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restriction minimizes variation based on differences in regional 
cultural or practice areas, differences in state laws regarding 
organizational form, and differences in state and local tax and ethics 
codes.19 
Seven sources were used to build the dataset: (1) print and Web 
versions of Martindale-Hubble,20 (2) print and Web versions of the 
Directory of Legal Employers from the NALP,21 (3) filings from the 
New York Secretary of State,22 (4) American Lawyer’s list of profits-
per-partner for the top 200 law firms,23 (5) American Lawyer Media, 
Corporate Counsel Division, Directory of In-House Law 
Departments at the Top 250 Companies,24 (6) individual law firm 
Web sites, and (7) telephone conversations with selected law firms to 
verify or clarify certain information.25  The data, along with detailed 
memoranda describing the data collection process, are publicly 
available at http://www.law.unc.edu/Data/EconomicsofLimited 
Liability. 
To shed further light on the choice of organizational form among 
New York law firms, the quantitative results were supplemented 
with interviews of three sets of individuals knowledgeable about and 
active in the debate regarding law firm choice of form: (1) partners 
 
 19. In a nationwide study of the choice of organizational form by law firms 
in 2003, Bob Hillman observed similar filing patterns.  See Robert W. Hillman, 
Organizational Choices of Professional Service Firms: An Empirical Study, 58 
BUS. LAW. 1387, 1397-1402 (2003).  In a more recent nationwide study, Eric 
Talley and John Romley also examined law firm choice of organizational form.  
John Romley & Eric Talley, Uncorporated Professionals, U. of S. Cal., CLEO 
Research Paper Series No. C04-18, (Sept. 3, 2004), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=587982.  Although, as a general rule, 
Romley and Talley observe choice of form patterns similar to those of New York 
law firms, they find that a firm’s size—measured in terms of the number of 
lawyers in 1993—is a statistically significant predicator of the law firm’s choice 
of organizational form as of 1999.  Id. at 31-32 & 52 tbl. 11.  See also Baker & 
Krawiec, supra note 12 (manuscript at 32-33) (contrasting the Romley & Talley 
findings with the results from the New York Data). 
 20. Martindale-Hubble’s searchable Web listings are available at 
http://martindale.com/xp/Martindale/home.xml. 
 21. The NALP Web directory is located at http://www.nalpdirectory.com/. 
 22. The New York Secretary of State maintains a searchable Web site, 
located at http://appsext5.dos.state.ny.us/corp_public/CORPSEARCH.ENTITY 
_SEARCH_ENTRY. 
 23. The American Lawyer publishes this information in two separate 
publications.  The Am Law 100, published in the July edition of the magazine, 
reports profits-per-partner for the one hundred most profitable U.S. law firms.  
See, e.g., The Am Law 100 2004, AM. LAW., July 2004, at 91, 133-35.  The Am 
Law 200, published in the August edition of the magazine, reports profits-per-
partner for firms ranking from 101 to 200 in terms of profitability.  See, e.g., 
The Am Law 200 2004, AM. LAW., Aug. 2004, at 83, 121-23. 
 24. The searchable directory is available at http://solis.365media.com/ALM/ 
corpcounsel/search.asp. 
 25. Baker & Krawiec, supra note 12, (manuscript at 20-27) (describing the 
data collection process and sources in more detail). 
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at New York law firms who had been active in their firms’ decision 
regarding organizational form; (2) law firm consultants who advise 
law firms on a variety of matters, including organizational form; and 
(3) law firm insurers who base malpractice liability insurance rates 
on a variety of factors thought to correlate to the risk of malpractice 
liability and thus collect information from law firms on those 
factors. 
Of particular interest for this Article are the interviews with 
law firm partners.  In all, seventy-five partners at sixty New York 
law firms were interviewed.  Most importantly, at least one partner 
at every GP firm with more than fifty lawyers was interviewed.  To 
add depth and understanding to the analysis, a small number of in-
house counsel and partners at law firms that were not in the New 
York Data, but were sufficiently similar to the sample of New York 
firms to possess insights into the choice of form question, were 
interviewed.26 
Interviews ranged from ten minutes to one-and-a-half hours 
and were conducted by telephone.27  All interviewees were familiar 
with the issues relating to the choice of organizational form at their 
firm.  At many firms, the interviewee was the managing partner or 
partner in charge of spearheading the choice of form decision.  At 
other firms, the choice of form issue apparently was debated 
sufficiently widely that all partners of a certain level of seniority 
seemed knowledgeable regarding the relevant issues.  Interviewees 
were encouraged to freely discuss the choice of organizational form 
at their firm without leading from the interviewer.  When necessary, 
interviewees were prompted to discuss particular issues relevant to 
the choice of organizational form through a list of questions.  The 
questions designed for GP partners are attached as Appendix A to 
this Article.  The questions designed for LLP partners are attached 
as Appendix B to this Article. 
B. General Interview Results 
Although law firm cultures are idiosyncratic and the 
explanations offered in support of each firm’s organizational form 
decision varied, several general themes arose from the interviews 
with law firm partners.  First, neither apathy nor a lack of attention 
to the costs and benefits of a particular organizational form 
accounted for the choice of form decision in any of the firms 
 
 26. For example, one foreign firm whose main office is located in New York 
City did not appear in the New York sample due to an idiosyncrasy in the 
manner by which the firm lists in Martindale-Hubble.  However, the choice of 
organizational form issues faced by this firm are substantially similar to those 
faced by other foreign firms in the New York sample. 
 27. All interview subjects were ensured confidentiality and are not 
identified by name or firm name in this Article.  For purposes of verifiability, 
redacted interview notes are available from the author. 
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interviewed for the study.28  In other words, pure “stickiness” did not 
seem to account for the observed filing patterns. 
This is not meant to suggest that the decision to convert to LLP 
status entails no transaction costs.  Even small changes, such as 
reprinting letterhead and business cards, can be costly, and simply 
generating agreement from, in some cases, hundreds of busy and 
opinionated law firm partners is no doubt difficult.  However, in 
almost every case, the reasons for this difficulty appeared to stem 
from the fact that many partners perceived genuine costs to 
operating in the LLP form.29  In addition, partners at a small 
number of firms indicated that their firm had been slow to switch 
from the GP form because limiting partner liability simply had not 
“been a priority” at the firm.30  In every case, however, this view 
changed substantially after the Arthur Andersen bankruptcy, as 
discussed more fully in Part III.C. of this Article.31 
Second, the most frequently cited factors that arose in 
connection with the decision to convert to an LLP at most firms 
were: concerns over lost collegiality;32 concerns over the perceived 
negative signal to clients associated with limited liability, a factor 
discussed more fully in Part V.A.; whether a sufficient number of 
peer firms had converted to an LLP to mute this perceived negative 
signal, also discussed in Part V.A.; the “Arthur Andersen effect,” 
discussed in Part III.C.; and the potential connection between lock-
step compensation and limited liability.33 
Third, nearly every interview subject asserted a belief that full 
movement of law firms into the LLP form was inevitable.34  This 
conviction was held even by partners at firms that had determined, 
at least for the time being, to remain a GP.  Fourth, issues relating 
to whether the partnership agreement should be revised had stalled 
discussions at a handful of firms, although each of those firms was 
eventually able to overcome those issues and file for LLP status.35  
Fifth, some law firm partners cited the size, decentralization, and 
 
 28. Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file 
with the author). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text. 
 32. See Baker & Krawiec, supra note 12 (manuscript at 12-14). 
 33. Id. (manuscript at 54-55). 
 34. Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file 
with the author); Baker & Krawiec, supra note 12 (manuscript at 59-60). 
 35. Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file 
with the author).  As noted, New York’s LLP statute permits the old 
partnership agreement to continue to govern partner relations.  However, some 
partners in high-risk, high-return specialties apparently feel that, if fellow 
partners are no longer sharing the liability risk, they should receive a lower 
share of the profits from these activities, necessitating a renegotiation of the 
partnership agreement.  See Baker & Krawiec, supra note 12 (manuscript at 
55). 
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specialization of modern law firm practice as contributing to the 
decision to limit individual partner liability.36 
C. Filing Patterns 
In order to examine overall filing patterns by New York law 
firms, firms were categorized as “large” (more than fifty lawyers in 
2004), “small” (between twenty-five and fifty lawyers in 2004), and 
“elite” (profits-per-partner of $1 million or more during 2002).37  
These results are graphically depicted in Chart 1. 
 
Chart 138 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As shown in Chart 1, LLP filings peaked in 1994-1995, the first 
two years after New York’s LLP statute became effective, tapering 
off to a low in 2000.  During these years, filings were divided 
roughly equally between large and small law firms.  Very few elite 
firms filed during this time period.  Filings began rising again in 
2001-2003.  However, the character of filings during this period 
differs from the pattern observed during the earlier peak.  Large 
firms dominate the filings in the 2001-2003 period.  Moreover, this 
is the period when most elite firms chose to file. 
In order to examine filing patterns by firm profit levels, LLP 
filing dates were plotted against profits-per-partner in 2003.  The 
results are depicted graphically in Chart 2. 
 
 
 
 
 36. Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file 
with the author); Baker & Krawiec, supra note 12 (manuscript at 56). 
 37. Baker & Krawiec, supra note 12 (manuscript at 28 n.68). 
 38. Id. (manuscript at Chart 1, at 86). 
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Chart 239 
 
 
 
Chart 2 depicts a similar filing pattern to that shown in Chart 
1.  The scatter plot shows a rough bunching of LLP filings into two 
groups: (1) lower profit firms, which filed primarily between late 
1994 and October 1998, and (2) higher profit firms, which filed 
primarily after late 2002. 
Two apparent outliers are worth mentioning.  First, Milbank, 
Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, LLP filed in February of 1999, far earlier 
than other firms with similar profits-per-partner.  This filing closely 
followed the summer 1998 conviction and sentencing to fifteen 
months in federal prison of Milbank partner John Gellene for filing 
false declarations in a bankruptcy proceeding.40  Although the 
timing of the two events caused many law firm partners to speculate 
that the Gellene incident had heightened Milbank partners’ liability 
fears and prompted the firm’s filing, Milbank partners deny any 
connection between the two events.41 
The Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP  filing in 2001 
makes Skadden the “first mover” in the eyes of its cohort firms.42  
 
 39. Id. (manuscript at Chart 2, at 87). 
 40. See generally MILTON C. REGAN, JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A 
WALL STREET LAWYER (2004) (detailing the Gellene affair); Laura Pearlman, 
Trading One Striped Suit (With Cuffs) For Another, AM. LAW., Oct. 1998, at 13 
(discussing the Gellene incident). 
 41. Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file 
with the author); confidential interviews with Milbank partners (interview 
notes on file with the author) (attributed with permission of interview subjects). 
 42. Interestingly, the Milbank filing was not similarly regarded by other 
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Many partners at elite law firms indicated that the Skadden filing 
was noted by members of their firms and, in many cases, caused the 
firms in question to begin re-evaluating their decision to remain a 
GP.  Although many of these firms eventually decided to wait until 
other cohort firms had determined to file before filing for LLP 
status, the Skadden filing was clearly a meaningful event in the 
eyes of many major law firm partners. 
Overall, the two charts suggest a filing pattern in which: (1) 
some law firms took advantage of the new LLP statute immediately, 
whereas others hesitated many years; (2) firms tended to file around 
the same time as other firms with similar profits-per-partner; and 
(3) elite firms appeared more hesitant to file than did non-elite 
firms.  These conclusions are supported by interview data. 
As discussed more fully below, interviews with law firm 
partners reveal that partners—particularly at elite firms—feared 
the negative signal that might be associated with attempts to limit 
partners’ personal liability for law firm debts.43  This was 
particularly true when very few of the firms viewed as competitors 
for prestige and clients had chosen to convert to LLP status.44 
In addition, one factor was repeatedly mentioned by law firms 
that had recently chosen to limit partner liability or were currently 
debating whether to do so as relevant to that decision: the demise of 
Arthur Andersen.45  The Andersen bankruptcy seemed especially 
salient at large, elite firms, many of whom only determined to 
convert to an LLP after 2001. 
Prior to Enron, partners at many law firms, particularly elite 
firms, considered the threat of a liability judgment that exceeded the 
firm’s malpractice insurance a remote risk.46  Given the perceived 
 
major law firms, perhaps because many observers considered the filing to be 
motivated by the Gellene incident.  Confidential interviews with law firm 
partners (interview notes on file with the author).  As previously noted, 
Milbank denies any such connection.  See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 43. Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file 
with the author); see also infra notes 84-89 and accompanying text (discussing 
signaling effects). 
 44. Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file 
with the author); see also infra notes 93-123 and accompanying text (discussing 
herding). 
 45. Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file 
with author); see also Anthony Lin, After Enron, Firms Rethink Partnership, 
N.Y. L.J., Apr. 15, 2002, at 1 (“In light of the potentially crippling liability faced 
by Arthur Andersen, Vinson & Elkins, and Kirkland & Ellis for their roles in 
the collapse of Enron Corp., major law firms are considering again whether to 
form themselves into limited liability partnerships.”). 
 46. Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file 
with the author).  See also Lin, supra note 45, at 2.  According to Ward Bower, a 
principal at the law firm consultancy Altman Weil, prior to Enron, many firms 
assumed that malpractice was an insurable risk, but according to Kenneth J. 
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costs associated with limited liability, many firms felt that the 
benefits of LLP status were simply insufficient to overcome the 
costs.  For many firms, however, this perception changed with the 
trial and subsequent bankruptcy of Arthur Andersen.  Suddenly, the 
possibility of a liability judgment that would exhaust partners’ 
personal assets as well as the firm’s liability insurance seemed 
entirely plausible.  The fact that a “white shoe” firm as large and 
reputable as Arthur Andersen could simply crumble was a sobering 
experience for many law firm partners and one that changed their 
outlook on limited liability.  In fact, several partners insisted that 
their firms never would have switched to an LLP had the Enron and 
Arthur Andersen debacles not occurred.47 
The filing patterns depicted in Charts 1 and 2 are in marked 
contrast to the choice of organizational form by newly formed New 
York law firms.48  Although Martindale-Hubble lists only six New 
York law firms established between 1994, when New York’s LLP 
statute became effective, and April 6, 2005, all six formed as limited 
liability entities.49  However, one should not read too much into this 
data.  First, the small sample size of six firms cautions against 
drawing general conclusions about new firm filing patterns.  In 
addition, as a general rule, the new firms are fairly small and 
certainly not “elite.”  Accordingly, it is not clear that they are 
substantially different from the early filers in the New York Data. 
D. Testing the Economic Theories of Partnership 
The logical starting point upon observing a filing pattern of this 
sort is to consider whether any economic factors may be motivating 
law firm choice of organizational form.  Contrary to much legal 
commentary, which tends to cite the high costs of personal liability 
as a reason for avoiding the GP form and advises business and 
professional organizations to avoid doing business as a GP,50 
 
Laverriere, a Shearman & Sterling partner, “[y]ou can’t insure against 
10-figure liability.”  Id. 
 47. Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file 
with the author). 
 48. I thank Lillian BeVier and Rip Verkerke for suggesting this line of 
inquiry. 
 49. The firms were identified by searching the Martindale-Hubble database 
on Lexis on April 6, 2005.  Five of the six firms established in New York City 
after 1994 were organized as LLPs.  The other was an LLC. 
 50. See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 88-89 (urging law firms currently 
doing business in the GP form to switch to a limited liability entity); Sandy 
Lovell, Few Firms Form Limited-Liability Corporations: Inertia and Fear of 
Client Reaction Breed Reluctance, 163 N.J. L.J., Feb. 12, 2001, at 25, 25 (stating 
that forming a limited liability entity instead of a general partnership should be 
“a no-brainer”); Tom Alleman, To LLP or Not to LLP: When Striking Out on 
Your Own, Know the Form of Business Your Practice Will Take, THE LEGAL 
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economists assert the many benefits of the GP form.  Some of these 
benefits—for example, those that stem from illiquidity or profit 
sharing—are not unique to the GP form and, instead, are benefits of 
both the GP and LLP forms.  In contrast, the asserted benefits of the 
GP form that stem from the full personal liability of GP partners are 
unique to the GP form.51 
The Economics of Limited Liability examines six theories 
traditionally espoused in the economic literature as rationales for 
the GP form: insurance, monitoring, generating trust and 
collegiality, quality signaling, preventing grabbing and leaving, and 
providing incentives to mentor.52  The theories are tested by 
collecting data on each firm’s organizational form, filing date, 
designation of New York City as the main office, number of lawyers, 
number of offices, growth rate (measured as the yearly percentage 
change in each firm’s number of lawyers, averaged from 1994-2003), 
profits-per-partner, average number of in-house counsel, total 
number of in-house counsel, number of clients in the Fortune 250, 
starting associate salaries, partnership structure (multi-tiered 
versus single tier), self-identification of collegial environment in the 
NALP directory, and status as either a domestic or foreign law 
firm.53 
It should be noted that many of the economic theories of 
partnership are implausible on their face. Economists tend to 
incorrectly assume that certain characteristics of the partnership 
form—for example, profit sharing or individual partner liability for 
firm debts—are unique to the partnership form and cannot be 
replicated either through alternative organizational forms or 
through contract or other mechanisms.54  In fact, however, many of 
 
INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 5, 2003, at 3 (stating that “[f]or most small groups, there 
really are only two choices—limited liability partnership or some form of 
corporation”); Lee Berton & Joann S. Lublin, Seeking Shelter: Partnership 
Structure is Called into Question as Liability Risk Rises, WALL ST. J., June 10, 
1992, at A9 (quoting Belverd Needles, former director of DePaul University’s 
School of Accounting, as stating, “[w]ith such risks, the partnership may go the 
way of the dodo”). 
 51. Baker & Krawiec, supra note 12 (manuscript at 2). 
 52. Id. (manuscript at 7-20). 
 53. Id. (manuscript at 20-27). 
 54. Much legal literature, in contrast, considers such factors relevant only 
for public corporations.  Compare, e.g., Roger E. Meiners et al., Piercing the Veil 
of Limited Liability, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 351, 364 (1979) (arguing that the 
difference in the limited liability default rule between corporations and GPs is 
insignificant because the default rule can be altered through a variety of private 
mechanisms) with, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited 
Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 93 (1985) (advocating that 
“the distinctive aspects of the publicly held corporation—delegation of 
management to a diverse group of agents and risk bearing by those who 
contribute capital–depend on an institution like limited liability”), and Henry 
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the asserted benefits of the partnership form can be and frequently 
are replicated through a variety of devices.  For example, profit-
sharing can be and frequently is accomplished not only through the 
partnership form but also through the LLC and close corporation.  
Similarly, organizing as a GP is not the only mechanism available 
for placing the personal wealth of the firm’s owners within reach of 
creditors.55 
After both a theoretical and an empirical analysis, we conclude 
in The Economics of Limited Liability that the New York Data do 
not support any of the prevailing economic theories of partnership.56  
Naturally, the fact that the New York Data do not support the 
traditional economic theories of partnership does not prove that 
those theories are false.  The standard proxies typically employed to 
test phenomena such as the ease of monitoring, the existence of 
information asymmetry, and levels of firm collegiality are simply 
that—proxies.  Furthermore, certain variables that one might 
hypothesize impact choice of organizational form and/or the speed 
with which such decisions are reached—such as practice area, 
whether the firm practices lock-step compensation, and what sort of 
decision-making rules and norms govern the firm—are not publicly 
available in any reliable form and, thus, cannot be included in 
regression analyses. 
Nonetheless, the fact that the data fail to support existing 
theories of partnership (combined with the theoretical weakness of 
many of the theories) should prompt scholars to search for 
alternative justifications for the existence of the partnership form 
and the GP form in particular.  In the next section, I explore one 
such possibility—signaling theory—but demonstrate that the theory 
as currently articulated is not well supported by the New York Data 
and suffers from several theoretical problems.  At the same time, 
interview data indicate that signaling fears did impact law firm 
choice of form.  Part V of this Article suggests that some 
modifications to the signaling theory of partnership could render the 
 
G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 
259, 260-68 (1967) (arguing that the publicly held corporation could not exist 
without limited liability). 
 55. For example, the firm’s owners could also personally guarantee debts, 
post personal bonds, or over-capitalize the corporation.  See, e.g., Easterbrook & 
Fischel, supra note 54, at 103-04 (arguing that voluntary corporate creditors 
frequently require personal guarantees or use other mechanisms to alter the 
default rule of limited liability for shareholders); Henry Hansmann & Reinier 
Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 
429-30 (2000); Amalia D. Kessler, Limited Liability In Context: Lessons From 
The French Origins Of The American Limited Partnership, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 
511, 530-43 (2003). 
 56. Baker & Krawiec, supra note 12 (manuscript at 59). 
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theory both more theoretically plausible and more consistent with 
the New York Data. 
IV. PREVAILING SIGNALING THEORIES OF PARTNERSHIP FORM 
There are two variations on the signaling theory of partnership 
currently employed in the organizational form literature: the 
monitoring version and the profit-sharing version.57  In this section, 
I discuss the standard measures employed to test these theories and 
conclude that neither version is well supported by the New York 
Data. 
A. Signaling Monitoring 
According to the traditional signaling theory of partnership, 
firms operate in the GP form in order to send a signal to clients and 
prospective clients that the firm provides a higher quality legal 
service.  Operating in the GP form provides this signal because, 
although the quality of legal services is difficult to observe, the 
firm’s organizational form is easily observable and clients 
understand that the unlimited personal liability of the GP form 
encourages partners to monitor each other, thus enhancing the 
quality of legal service.58 
There are both theoretical and empirical reasons to doubt the 
explanatory power of the monitoring version of the quality signaling 
theory.  As a theoretical matter, although unlimited partner liability 
may be one credible signal of quality, it is not the only credible 
signal.  For example, reputation established through repeated client 
interactions is another potential signal of quality and one arguably 
 
 57. See, e.g., infra notes 56-59, 69-71, and accompanying text. 
 58. Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz propose that the difficulty in 
monitoring employee output explains the prevalence of the partnership form 
among professional firms.  Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, 
Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 passim 
(1972). However, Henry Hansmann asserts that Alchian and Demsetz overstate 
the monitoring problem associated with professional firms, noting that most 
firms go to great lengths to determine each partner’s contribution to the bottom 
line, including tracking billable hours, and adopting partnership agreements 
that distribute profits in accordance with individual productivity.  HENRY 
HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 70–71 (1996); see also George 
Rutherglen & Kevin A. Kordana, A Farewell to Tournaments? The Need for an 
Alternative Explanation of Law Firm Structure and Growth, 84 VA. L. REV. 
1695, 1696-98 (1998) (making a similar argument). Others, however, have 
challenged Hansmann on this point, arguing that monitoring the work-product 
of professional service providers such as lawyers is not as easy as Hansmann 
suggests.  See, e.g., David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the 
Tournament of Lawyers: Tracking, Seeding, and Information Control in the 
Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1581, 1597–1600 
(1998). 
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less expensive than unlimited personal liability for partnership 
debts.  Moreover, legal scholars have identified other mechanisms—
most notably, efficiency wages and promotion tournaments—that at 
least partially address the monitoring problem faced by law firms.59  
Importantly, both efficiency wages and promotion tournaments are 
observable by clients and may operate as effective quality signals.  
In short, in order for the monitoring version of the quality signaling 
argument to persuade, the GP must be the cheapest credible signal 
of quality. 
As an empirical matter, the New York Data fail to support this 
version of the quality signaling theory.  Like all quality signaling 
theories, the monitoring version of the quality signaling theory of 
partnership depends on an information asymmetry between the 
producers and consumers of a given product (in this case, legal 
 
 59. In the scholarship on law firms, efficiency wages and promotion 
tournaments are discussed as mechanisms for the firm to solve its monitoring 
problems vis-à-vis associates.  A key point not often discussed in the literature, 
however, is that firms use these lengthy apprenticeship periods as a means to 
obtain information and retain as partners only those lawyers who will no longer 
require monitoring. 
  The basic mechanisms through which efficiency wages and tournament 
solve the monitoring problem are as follows.  By providing employees with an 
above-market clearing wage, efficiency wages create a large applicant pool and 
encourage applicants to favorably differentiate themselves from the rest of the 
pool, thus reducing employers’ screening costs.  In addition, efficiency wages 
incentivize employees to work hard once hired in order to maintain their 
above—market wage, thus reducing the employer’s monitoring costs.  David B. 
Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate 
Law Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 CAL. L. REV. 493, 518-19 (1996); 
Laura N. Beny, Reflections on the Diversity-Performance Nexus at Elite 
American Law Firms: Toward a Theory of a Diversity Norm, at 8-9 (2005) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Wake Forest Law Review), available 
at http://repositories.cdlib.org/ berkeley_law_econ/Spring2005/12. 
  Promotion tournaments, or the “up or out” system employed at many 
law firms, create an organizational system of many years of apprenticeship 
after which the top performing associates receive a sharp increase in pay and 
status (i.e., partnership) and the others are terminated.  Individual associates 
are presumed to work hard to demonstrate their value, even without careful 
monitoring by the firm, because they want to signal themselves as most worthy 
of the partnership prize.  See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT 
OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 93-102 (1991); Beny, 
supra, at 8-9.  For other discussions of how lawyers and law firms solve 
monitoring problems, see generally Tom Ginsburg & Jeffrey A. Wolf, The 
Market for Elite Law Firm Associates, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 909 (2004) 
(discussing the market and recruiting process for lawyers at elite law firms); 
Price, supra note 18 (discussing the limitations of the application of the 
tournament theory in light of the Silicon Valley dot-com bubble); Rudy Santore 
& Alan D. Viard, Legal Fee Restrictions, Moral Hazard, and Attorney Rents, 44 
J.L. & ECON. 549 (2001) (discussing and providing a political economy 
explanation for the legal fee restrictions prohibited by most states and the 
American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct). 
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services).  Because more sophisticated clients are less likely to suffer 
information asymmetry regarding the quality of legal services that 
they receive than are less sophisticated clients and because clients 
in the Fortune 250 are more likely to possess this sophistication 
than clients that are not, if the monitoring version of the signaling 
theory of partnership holds, then the data should show a significant, 
positive effect of the number of each firm’s clients in the Fortune 
250 (“FORTUNE”) on the likelihood that the firm is an LLP.60 
Similarly, prior research indicates that in-house counsel play an 
important role in monitoring outside law firms and in reducing the 
level of information asymmetry suffered by clients regarding the 
quality of legal services received.61  This would suggest that clients 
with a higher number of both total (“IN-HOUSE-TOTAL”) and 
average (“IN-HOUSE-AVG”) in-house counsel suffer less 
information asymmetry and that the law firms that serve these 
clients have less need to signal quality through the GP form than do 
firms whose clients employ fewer in-house counsel.62  Accordingly, 
the data should reveal a significant, positive effect of IN-HOUSE-
AVG and IN-HOUSE-TOTAL on the probability that the firm is an 
LLP.63  The coefficients on FORTUNE, IN-HOUSE-AVG, and IN-
HOUSE-TOTAL are all statistically insignificant, undermining the 
monitoring version of the quality signaling theory of partnership.64 
Finally, if organizing as an LLP really sends a negative signal 
to clients, then firms that convert to LLP status should either: (1) 
charge less for legal services than they would if they had remained a 
GP or (2) see a significant, negative, abnormal change in firm profits 
 
 60. Cf. Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the 
Elite Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 277, 284-93 (1985) (discussing the important 
role of in-house counsel in monitoring and selecting outside counsel, especially 
at the largest American corporations); John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation 
in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1301, 1310 n.40 
(2001) (“Older, larger, and more profitable companies are more likely to have 
better and larger in-house legal staffs more capable of monitoring outside 
firms.”). 
 61. ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM 59 (1988); Mark C. Suchman, 
Working Without a Net: The Sociology of Legal Ethics in Corporate Litigation, 
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 837, 856 (1998). 
 62. See Ryon Lancaster & Brian Uzzi, From Colleague to Employee: 
Determinants of Changing Career Governance Structures in Elite Law Firms, in 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM ORGANIZATION: MICROFOUNDATIONS AND 
STRUCTURAL FORMS 360-70 (Anna Grandori ed., 2004) (using this same variable 
to test the level of information asymmetries in the market for legal services). 
 63. The logarithm of the average number of in-house counsel, rather than 
the average number of in-house counsel, is used in order to minimize the skew 
in the in-house counsel numbers.  See Baker & Krawiec, supra note 12 
(manuscript at 40-42 n.96) (explaining this measure). 
 64. Id. (manuscript at 41-42 and tbls. 9-10). 
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that it would not have experienced if it had remained a GP.65  
Interview data rule out the first possibility—all partners 
interviewed indicated that the conversion to an LLP had not 
impacted relations with clients in any way.  Although more 
problematic, the second possibility (that switching to an LLP 
reduces firm profits, at least in the first few years) cannot be 
completely rejected.66  However, the quantitative data, interview 
results, and theoretical limitations of this version of the quality 
signaling theory caution against accepting the theory without some 
modifications, as discussed in Part V of this Article.67 
B. Signaling Profit Sharing 
A newer variation on the signaling theory of partnership posits 
that rather than signaling superior monitoring, GP firms are 
instead signaling a profit-sharing arrangement.  Originating from 
Jonathan Levin and Steven Tadelis, this version of the quality 
signaling theory asserts that a profit-sharing enterprise, such as a 
partnership, has less incentive than does a non-profit-sharing 
enterprise, such as a corporation, to hire low-quality workers.68  This 
is because partners in profit-sharing enterprises care about profits-
per-partner—not total profits.  As a result, a new partner will be 
added to the firm only if she increases the average profits-per-
partner.  This is in contrast to a corporation, which has an incentive 
to hire any worker who will marginally increase total profits, 
because the new worker does not share in this increase.69 
The profit-sharing version of the quality signaling theory is 
based on an unsupported assumption that the partnership form is a 
superior mechanism for signaling that the firm engages in profit 
sharing.  As already noted, other organizational forms, including the 
LLC and the corporation, can be and frequently are structured as 
profit-sharing enterprises.  Moreover, law firms increasingly are 
abandoning profit-sharing models of partnership in favor of 
organizations characterized by multi-tiered partnership levels, 
non—equity partners, and “eat what you kill” compensation 
strategies.70  In other words, law firms—regardless of organizational 
 
 65. Id. (manuscript at 15). 
 66. See id. (manuscript at 37-40 and tbls. 7-8) (discussing the empirical 
findings on choice of form and firm profits). 
 67. See infra notes 84-123 and accompanying text. 
 68. Jonathan Levin & Steven Tadelis, Profit-sharing and the Role of 
Professional Partnerships, 120 Q.J. ECON. 131, 131 (2005) (“We take the 
defining feature of a partnership to be redistribution of profits among 
partners.”) (footnote omitted). 
 69. Id. at 144. 
 70. See, e.g., Kristin Nicole Johnson, Note, Resolving the Title VII Partner-
Employee Debate, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1067, 1081-85 (2003) (describing the ways 
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form—increasingly seem to resemble traditional employment 
enterprises, rather than profit-sharing enterprises. 
As an empirical matter, the most that one can conclude from the 
New York Data is that signaling profit sharing cannot fully explain 
the choice of organizational form among New York law firms.  
Because the GP and the LLP are identical with respect to profit 
sharing, if signaling profit sharing to clients fully explains the 
choice of organizational form among New York law firms, then all or 
nearly all of the firms in the New York sample should be LLPs, as it 
provides all of the profit-sharing benefits of the GP without the 
associated costs of personal liability for partnership debts.71  The fact 
that a sizeable percentage of firms are still organized as GPs and 
that an even larger number continued to be so organized prior to 
2000 undermines this possibility. 
Two other factors, however, cast doubt on the notion that this 
version of the quality signaling theory of partnership is even a 
contributing factor, much less a decisive factor, in law firm choice of 
organizational form.  First, as already noted, the partnership does 
not provide unique profit-sharing opportunities unavailable through 
other organizational forms.  Second, the interview data undermine 
this version of the quality signaling theory. None of the interview 
subjects mentioned signaling profit sharing as relevant to their 
firms’ choice of organizational form.72  This is not surprising.  As 
lawyers, these interview subjects are fully aware that the 
partnership form is unnecessary to attain profit-sharing benefits. 
 
in which law firms today resemble traditional employment relationships more 
than traditional partner relationships, including multi-tiered partnerships and 
the substitution of “eat what you kill” compensation for profit-sharing 
compensation); Joe Altonji & Bill Johnston, A Change of Priorities: Too Much 
Emphasis on Billable Hours Has Been Detrimental to Associate Development, 
LEGAL TIMES, May 6, 2001, at 21 (noting that many law firms have abandoned 
lock-step compensation in favor of “a more corporate approach to 
compensation”); Special Report: The Future of the Law; Fifteen Experts—From 
General Counsel and Managing Partners of Major National Law Firms to a 
Legal Aid Specialist—Contemplate Changes to Come in the Next 10 Years, 
LEGAL TIMES, June 26, 2000, at 42 (quoting a Hildebrandt International 
consultant as stating that “[m]any of the large firms are going to start following 
a more corporate model and move away from the associate-partner structure” 
and also predicting the abandonment of lock-step compensation and the 
continued growth of non-equity partners). 
 71. Although, in theory, if this version of the signaling theory of 
partnership fully explains the choice of organizational form, all firms in the 
New York sample should be LLPs.  The hypothesis is framed as all or nearly all 
and—without more—this version of the signaling theory would not be rejected 
due to a few firms still clinging to the GP form.  This is because, in reality, 
there is always a possibility that inertia, lack of attention, or transactions costs 
prevent a handful of firms from adopting the ideal organizational form. 
 72. Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file 
with the author). 
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C. Section Summary 
In summary, the Data provide little, if any, empirical support 
for signaling theories of partnership as currently formulated.  In 
addition, both versions of the signaling theory of partnership are 
problematic for theoretical reasons.  Neither limited liability nor 
profit sharing is a characteristic unique to the partnership form.  
Instead, both can be replicated through other contractual 
mechanisms or organizational forms.  As a result, without some 
evidence that organizational form is the cheapest or most reliable 
mechanism for sending this signal, it seems improbable that law 
firms are using organizational form to signal quality to the market. 
There are other troubling aspects of existing signaling theories 
of partnership as well.  First, neither signaling theory, as currently 
formulated, can explain the hesitance of elite firms to convert to 
LLP status.  Under both versions of the quality signaling argument, 
the GP form sends a positive signal of quality.  Both versions thus 
predict that the firms with the most to gain from remaining a GP 
should be those firms most in need of quality signaling.  In other 
words, the firms most likely to incur the costs of retaining full 
partner liability should be those firms that suffer the greatest 
information asymmetry between firm and client.  However, there is 
no reason to believe that elite firms suffer from greater information 
asymmetries with clients than do other firms.  In fact, the evidence 
indicates the opposite: elite firms represent more clients in the 
Fortune 250 and clients that employ larger numbers of in-house 
counsel.73  These measures are thought to reduce information 
asymmetry, not increase it.  Therefore, signaling theory as currently 
formulated would produce the opposite filing pattern than the one 
observed in the New York Data.  That is, existing versions of 
signaling theory predict that elite law firms should file more quickly 
than non-elite firms, not more slowly. 
Of course, signaling quality through the GP form should be less 
costly to elite firms than non-elite ones.  This is because if one 
assumes that elite firms produce a higher quality legal product than 
non-elite firms, then their risk of incurring personal liability should 
be less.  As such, signaling quality by remaining a GP is a less 
expensive signal for elite firms than for non-elite ones.  If this is so, 
then elite firms could signal quality through the GP form when non-
elite firms do not because it is cheaper for elite firms to do so, 
despite the fact that elite firms have no greater need to signal 
quality than do non-elite firms.  This is consistent with elite firms’ 
reactions to the Arthur Andersen bankruptcy. The bankruptcy 
appears to have changed elite firms’ perceptions about the costs to 
 
 73. Baker & Krawiec, supra note 12 (manuscript at App. C) (listing the 
number of Fortune 250 clients of New York law firms, as well as the average 
and total number of Fortune 250 in-house counsel represented by each firm). 
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elite firms of operating in the GP form, finally causing elite firms to 
conclude that the costs of operating in the GP form outweighed the 
benefits.74 
Although initially plausible, the differential signaling costs of 
elite and non-elite firms fails to fully explain the hesitance of GP 
firms to convert to LLP status.  As discussed more fully in Part V.A., 
law firm partners themselves demonstrated little concern with the 
potential positive signal associated with GP status and instead 
seemed to focus their energies on finding a method (coordinating the 
timing of their LLP filing to coincide with the filings of competitor 
and/or peer firms) to garner the benefits of the GP form while 
minimizing the costs associated with any negative signal potentially 
sent by the LLP filing. 
In addition, the evidence fails to demonstrate that 
organizational form was ever considered a credible signal of 
quality—either positive or negative—by law firm clients.  As noted, 
all law firm partners revealed in interviews that the LLP conversion 
had not altered client relations or billing in any way.75  Similarly, 
firms retaining GP status in the face of conversions by competitor 
firms gave no indication that they had been rewarded by clients 
with higher billable rates or more business.  Finally, although the 
interpretation of the empirical tests regarding the impact, if any, of 
a change in organizational form on law firm profitability are difficult 
to interpret, the New York Data fail to strongly support the notion 
that a change in organizational form significantly impacts law firm 
profits. 
The monitoring version of the quality signaling theory faces a 
further hurdle—the lack of evidence that the GP form induces 
superior monitoring.  Both the quantitative analysis and the 
interview results from the New York Data fail to support any 
version of the monitoring theory of partnership.76 
Law firm partner interview subjects were uniform in their 
rejection of this justification for the GP form.77  Interestingly, most 
interview subjects were familiar with the theory that placing 
partners’ personal assets at risk through the GP form induces 
partners to monitor each others’ performance.78  However, interview 
subjects tended to scoff at this theory of partnership form for two 
reasons.  First, many law firm partners pointed to the size, 
specialization, and geographic dispersion of modern law firm 
 
 74. See supra notes 45-47, infra notes 88-90, and accompanying text 
(discussing elite firms’ reactions to the Arthur Andersen bankruptcy). 
 75. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text. 
 76. Baker & Krawiec, supra note 12 (manuscript at 36-37) (discussing the 
monitoring theories of partnership and concluding that they are not supported 
by the New York Data). 
 77. Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file 
with the author). 
 78. Id. 
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practice as limiting the effectiveness of any attempts at this type of 
monitoring.  To many partners, the notion that a securities law 
specialist in New York could meaningfully monitor a trust and 
estate lawyer in the Dallas office was absurd.79  Second, many 
interview subjects were offended by the notion that law firm 
members would fail to undertake monitoring efforts to the best of 
their abilities in the absence of such personal liability.  As discussed 
by many interview subjects, it is not the fear of personal liability 
that induces monitoring of other partners, but rather a desire to 
maintain the firm’s reputation, maximize billing rates, and enhance 
year-end partner profits that induces this effort.80 
Finally, evidence of malpractice insurance pricing undermines 
the monitoring theory of partnership.  If partnership theories based 
on the notion that the GP form induces the provision of higher 
quality legal services are true, then insurance companies should 
charge GPs higher malpractice insurance rates than LLPs in 
recognition of their higher liability risk.  However, interviews with 
law firm insurers indicate that insurance companies do not consider 
organizational form in setting insurance rates.81  This is confirmed 
by interviews with law firm partners, who reported that the decision 
 
 79. Id.; see also Richard C. Reuben, Added Protection, 80 A.B.A. J., Sept. 
1994, at 54, 55-56 (quoting Robert R. Keatinge, Chair of the ABA Business Law 
Section Partnership Committee’s Subcommittee on Limited Liability 
Companies, as stating, “[w]hen you think about it, there is nothing I as a tax 
lawyer can do that will protect against someone from another department 
within the firm screwing up a water law issue”). 
 80. Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file 
with the author). 
 81. Interviews with insurers (interview notes on file with the  author); see 
also Jett Hanna, Legal Malpractice Insurance and Limited Liability Entities: An 
Analysis of Malpractice Risk and Underwriting Responses, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 
641, 645 (1998) (“[T]here is no reason for the insurer to modify its assessment of 
the risk of suit based on limited liability status.”); Robert W. Hillman, The 
Impact of Partnership Law on the Legal Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 
409 (1998) (“LLP status does not reduce the liability of the partnership itself, 
which means the need for insurance underwriters to insist on implementation 
of monitoring mechanisms is largely unaffected by conversion of a firm from a 
general partnership into an LLP.”) (footnote omitted).  The discussion by Mr. 
Hanna (a Vice-President for Underwriting and Administration at Texas 
Lawyer’s Insurance Exchange (“TLIE”)) of the lack of connection between law 
firm organizational form and insurance rates is particularly enlightening.  
Although he notes that the TLIE’s empirical evidence shows a decrease in 
malpractice claims that coincides with the advent of Texas’s LLP statute, he 
concludes that the two events are almost certainly unrelated.  Hanna, supra, at 
647-48.  He states that, although the arguments about organizational form and 
increased monitoring are theoretically interesting, “[t]he motivation to 
supervise is usually born of long-term profit motive, not fear of liability.”  Id. at 
646.  Hanna further notes the difficulties of monitoring other partners in a 
modern law firm practice, concluding that “[g]iven the time requirements of 
modern law practice, it is a wonder that any supervision occurs in law firms.”  
Id. at 647. 
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to convert to a limited liability entity had been made after 
consultation with the firm’s insurance company and had not altered 
malpractice insurance premiums or coverage.82 
This is not to say that the GP form could not be employed as a 
signal of monitoring even in the absence of any real monitoring 
benefits.  In the face of severe information asymmetries with clients, 
law firms could perhaps employ such a false signal.  However, that 
seems unlikely in this context.  The ultimate consumer in this 
case—that is, the individual(s) responsible for the decision of 
whether and whom to retain as outside counsel—is senior in-house 
counsel.  These individuals are themselves experienced lawyers who 
likely spent at least some time practicing at a law firm.  It seems 
unlikely that these customers could have such a different knowledge 
set regarding law firm practice than could law firm partners (all of 
whom, as noted, reject the monitoring theory of partnership). 
In addition, the law firms slowest to convert to LLP status—
elite firms—seem even less likely to have an information asymmetry 
with clients regarding monitoring practices within law firms.  As 
already noted, elite firms have more sophisticated clients, who tend 
to employ more in-house counsel, than do non-elite firms.83 
V. ALTERNATIVE SIGNALING THEORIES 
Although neither data nor theory strongly support either 
version of the signaling theory of partnership form, the interview 
data suggest that there is something to the signaling approach.  As 
discussed more fully in this section, interview subjects exhibited a 
strong concern with the danger that converting to an LLP could be 
negatively perceived by clients.  This was particularly true at large, 
elite firms, which seemed unwilling to convert unless and until a 
substantial number of other elite firms were willing to convert.  In 
this section, I argue that both theory and the New York Data 
suggest that the signaling theory of partnership needs adjustment.  
I discuss three modifications to traditional signaling theories of 
partnership that render signaling theory more consistent with the 
New York Data.  It should be noted, however, that none of the 
empirical tests or interviews were specifically designed to test these 
modifications.  Accordingly, future research, if possible, should 
endeavor to test these proposed modifications against existing 
signaling theories. 
A. Negative v. Positive Signals 
Quality signaling theories tend to assume that the signal of 
 
 82. Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file 
with the author).  Not all interview subjects were familiar with their firms’ 
insurance coverage and rates.  However, among those who did have such 
familiarity, all reported that the coverage was unaffected by the transition.  Id. 
 83. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text. 
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relevance is the positive signal (either of superior monitoring or of 
profit sharing) associated with the GP form.  If true, then we should 
observe firms that attempt to distinguish themselves from the pack 
by retaining GP status in the face of movement by competitor firms.  
Instead, the data show the opposite: substantial herding behavior by 
law firms and a near obsessive concern with not being 
distinguishable from their cohort in terms of organizational form. 
The interviews with law firm partners reveal that, at nearly 
every firm, partners feared the negative signal that any limitation 
on personal liability might send to their clients and competitors.84  
This was particularly true when very few of the firm’s competitor 
firms had opted to limit their liability.  As stated by one law firm 
partner, “at the time we first debated becoming an LLP, none of the 
firms that we consider similar to us had limited their liability.  We 
didn’t want to be path breakers on this.”85 
At the same time, as more firms within a given cohort opt for 
LLP status, the perceived negative signal associated with limited 
liability diminishes, and the arguments in favor of limited liability 
are more persuasive.  As stated by one partner, “we’re currently 
reconsidering the issue and my prediction is that we’ll switch [to an 
LLP] at some point in the near future.  Now that most of the other 
firms like us have switched, the arguments against it seem 
weaker.”86 
This fear of the perceived negative signal associated with a 
limitation on partners’ personal liability for law firm debts was 
especially pronounced at elite law firms.  The interview data reveal 
that large, elite law firms, in particular, are extraordinarily 
conservative and are reluctant to take actions that may distinguish 
them in a negative manner from their competitor firms.87  For those 
firms that were slow to file for LLP status (as noted, this is true of 
the majority of elite firms), one of the most commonly cited 
rationales for the firm’s hesitation in filing was the fact that the 
firm did not want to file until a sufficient number of peer firms had 
also decided to file.88  Similarly, in addition to the Arthur Andersen 
effect, the most commonly cited motivation behind the eventual 
decision to file was the fact that a sufficient number of peer firms 
had finally determined to file.  Our interview data also reveal that 
law firm partners were in regular communication with peer firms 
about the decision to file and, in some cases, coordinated the timing 
 
 84. Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file 
with the author). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id.  Interestingly, it is not at all clear that this fear is well-founded.  
Every LLP interview subject indicated that the firm’s relations with clients had 
not been altered by the decision to become an LLP.  Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
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of their filings.89 
Similarly, those firms still organized as a GP at the time of the 
interviews gave no indication whatsoever that a desire to 
distinguish themselves positively from the LLP firms was 
motivating the decision to operate as a GP.  Instead, interview 
subjects at these firms tended to attribute the hesitation to fears of 
the potential negative signal associated with the move to LLP status 
and fears regarding lost collegiality.  Subjects noted, however, that 
the Arthur Andersen bankruptcy, combined with recent conversions 
by most other firms, had caused their firm to reevaluate the decision 
to remain a GP.  Most further predicted that their firm would 
ultimately convert.90 
Law firms, and elite firms, in particular, thus seem to display 
concern only with the potential negative signal associated with LLP 
status.  The negative impact, if any, associated with such a signal is 
bound to be muted when many of a firm’s cohorts have also adopted 
LLP status.  How can clients infer something negative about a 
particular firm from behavior in which everyone else is engaged?  
Accordingly, this aspect of the LLP filing pattern is consistent with 
research on network effects and innovation as (at least for the elite 
firms in the New York sample) it is only after a sufficient number of 
peer firms have converted to an LLP that the benefits of limited 
liability are perceived to outweigh the costs of the potential negative 
signal to clients.91 
B. This Negative Signal is More Costly to Elite Firms 
As noted, law firm partners (and elite law firm partners, in 
particular) seem especially concerned about the potential negative 
signal associated with the LLP form.  But the data (both 
quantitative and interview) reveal no reason why elite firms should 
be more concerned with this negative signal than should non-elite 
firms.  As already discussed, it is improbable that this could be the 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See generally Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Mandate and Market: Contract 
Transition in the Shadow of the International Order, 53 EMORY L.J. 691 (2004); 
Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An 
Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929 (2004); Marcel 
Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate 
Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997); 
Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 
VA. L. REV. 757 (1995).  But see Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Choice 
of Form and Network Externalities, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 79 (2001) (finding 
that network externalities—in the form of an established body of law—have 
only a minimal impact on the choice of organizational form); Michael J. 
Whincop, An Empirical Analysis of the Standardization of Corporate Charter 
Terms: Opting Out of the Duty to Care, 23 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 285 (2003) 
(finding similar evidence with respect to the evolution of Australian charter 
provisions). 
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result of greater information asymmetry between lawyer and client 
at elite firms.92  By any typical measure of information asymmetry, 
elite firm clients suffer from less, not more, information asymmetry 
than do clients of non-elite firms. 
It is possible, however, that all firms are equally burdened by 
the negative signal associated with LLP status but that such a 
negative signal costs elite firms more to bear because they have 
much more to lose.  If this is so, then elite firms are understandably 
more concerned with muting this negative signal associated with 
LLP status then are non-elite firms, as the signal is more costly to 
them. 
To illustrate, assume that elite firms have a reputation for 
providing high quality legal services that exceeds that of non-elite 
firms.  If we allow x to represent the quantity of reputation that any 
firm has for doing careful legal work, then x should be a higher 
number at elite firms than at non-elite firms.  Further assume that 
the conversion to LLP status reduces x by some percentage, say 10 
percent.  The conversion to LLP status should thus cost more the 
more elite the firm is. 
C. Are Law Firms Signaling Something Other than Quality—
Specifically, Status? 
Although difficult to pin down precisely, the notion came across 
in interviews that limiting personal liability for partnership debts 
was something that quality lawyers, especially those at elite firms, 
simply did not do.  Apparently, this attitude manifested itself early 
on during the New York LLP debate.  According to one lawyer who 
was a member of the drafting committee for New York’s LLP 
statute, the elite firms had no interest in the new legislation and felt 
that they would never use it.93  Instead, the LLP was viewed as an 
innovation designed for “ambulance chasers” and other non-elite 
lawyers.94 
If this is the case, then firms that hesitate to adopt the LLP 
form may not be attempting to signal quality, but high status.  This 
theory is consistent with the observed filing pattern by New York 
law firms because only certain firms can credibly signal that they 
are part of the high status cohort.  It, therefore, makes no sense for 
most lower status firms to incur the costs of retaining GP status, 
because they will not reap the benefits.  For firms that could 
credibly make such a claim, however, the benefits of the GP form (a 
credible high status signal) appeared to outweigh the costs (full 
personal liability) until the demise of Arthur Andersen altered elite 
firm perceptions of the costs of unlimited liability. 
 
 92. Confidential interviews with law firm partners (interview notes on file 
with the author). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
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The importance of status in markets and firm behavior is well-
recognized.  Scholars across disciplines have noted the impact of 
status on a variety of phenomena, including: the decision to engage 
in predatory pricing,95 the pricing of California wines,96 the diffusion 
of law firm associate raises across the nation,97 and the rate of 
adoption of anti-takeover defenses.98  Moreover, the role of status in 
the diffusion of innovation has been well studied.99  In particular, 
scholars have noted the tendency of firms to mimic relevant others 
when faced with an uncertain environment.100  Exogenous shocks, 
such as major regulatory or economic changes, increase 
environmental uncertainty and, correspondingly, increase the 
necessity of looking to similarly situated actors for cues on effective 
responses to the changed environment.  In this process, not all 
referents are treated equally, however.  Instead, the actions of 
competitors and high status firms are assigned particular 
importance. 
Researchers have studied the diffusion of such diverse 
innovations as hybrid corn,101 contractual provisions in venture 
 
 95. See generally Joel M. Podolny & Fiona M. Scott Morton, Social Status, 
Entry and Predation: The Case of British Shipping Cartels 1879-1929, 47 J. 
INDUS. ECON. 41 (1999) (examining the merchant shipping industry and finding 
that high status entrants are 40 percent less likely to be preyed upon than low 
status entrants). 
 96. See generally Beth A. Benjamin & Joel M. Podolny, Status, Quality, and 
Social Order in the California Wine Industry, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 563 (1999) 
(demonstrating that a wine producer’s status in the market influences its 
choices about quality). 
 97. See generally Bruce M. Price, A Butterfly Flaps its Wings in Menlo 
Park: An Organizational Analysis of Increases in Associate Salaries, WIS. L. 
REV. (forthcoming Spring 2005) (applying neoinstitutional theory to law firm 
salaries). 
 98. See generally Gerald F. Davis & Henrich R. Greve, Corporate Elite 
Networks and Governance Changes in the 1980s, 103 AM. J. SOC. 1 (1997) 
(empirically demonstrating that the adoption of anti-takeover defenses in the 
1980s was impacted by the rate at which high-status firms adopted such 
defenses). 
 99. Although related, the study of innovation and diffusion are actually two 
separate bodies of scholarship.  Research on innovation attempts to identify 
factors that lead individual actors to adopt or develop a new process, procedure, 
or technology.  The diffusion literature, by contrast, examines the mechanisms 
by which such adoptions spread across similarly situated actors.  See Mark C. 
Suchman, The Contract as Social Artifact, 37 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 91, 116-20 
(2003) (discussing the research on innovation and diffusion). 
 100. See generally Davis & Greve, supra note 98, at (noting that firms are 
most likely to copy the innovations of other similar organizations, especially 
when they are of high status). 
 101. Bruce Ryan & Neal C. Gross, The Diffusion of Hybrid Seed Corn in Two 
Iowa Communities, 8 RURAL SOC. 15 (1943).  Ryan and Gross found an S-shaped 
rate of adoption, which still characterizes the diffusion patterns of most 
innovations.  Id. at 21.  Bronwyn H. Hall, Innovation And Diffusion, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INNOVATION, at 466-68 (Jan Fagerberg et al. eds., 2005) 
(discussing the traditional S-shaped pattern). 
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capital financing,102 the multi-divisional corporation,103 corporate 
diversification,104 and the spread of anti-takeover defenses.105 In fact, 
one researcher reports that, as of 1995, over 4,000 books and papers 
had been published on the subject of diffusion.106  Despite such 
extensive study, diffusion scholars continue to debate the factors 
that lead to diffusion, and why certain innovations diffuse widely, 
while others seem to gain only limited adoption.107 
Importantly, however, many scholars provide arguments and 
data demonstrating that the diffusion of some innovations seems 
driven by reasons beyond the mere superiority or usefulness of the 
innovation in question. Specifically, researchers have argued that 
some organizations adopt innovations primarily because doing so 
signals legitimacy or status.  As noted by Mark Suchman, “[e]ven if 
conformity is largely ceremonial and bears little relation to 
underlying technical processes, organizations appear more 
legitimate (both to themselves and to others) when they display the 
formal attributes that society expects from exemplary entities of 
their type.”108 Researchers have found evidence linking concerns over 
legitimacy and status to the diffusion of diversity hiring at elite law 
firms,109 internal grievance procedures,110 equal employment 
 
 102. See generally Mark C. Suchman, Localism and Globalism in 
Institutional Analysis: The Emergence of Contractual Norms in Venture 
Finance, in THE INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF ORGANIZATIONS: 
INTERNATIONAL AND LONGITUDINAL STUDIES 39-63. (W. Richard Scott, & Søren 
Christensen, eds., 1995); Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as 
Facilitator: Lawyers and the Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon Valley, 
21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 679 (1996). 
 103. See generally Neil Fligstein, The Spread of the Multidivisional Form 
Among Large Firms, 1919-1979, 50 AM. SOC. REV. 377 (1985). 
 104. See generally NEIL FLIGSTEIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE 
CONTROL (1990). 
 105. See generally Davis & Greve, supra note 98. 
 106. See generally EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS xv (4th 
ed. 1995). 
 107. Much of the debate involves the extent to which diffusion is dictated 
solely by the value of the innovation in question, versus the extent to which 
firms engage in simple mimicry, either because they lack sufficient information 
to make a more informed decision or because adopters simply tend to follow 
fads and cycles.  For relevant discussions of this research, see generally Abhijit 
V. Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q.J. ECON. 797 (1992); Paul 
J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. J. SOC. 
REV. 147 (1983); David Strang & Michael W. Macy, In Search of Excellence: 
Fads, Success Stories, and Adaptive Emulation, 107 AM. J. SOC. 147 (2001); 
David Strang & Sarah A. Soule, Diffusion in Organizations and Social 
Movements: From Hybrid Corn to Poison Pills, 24 ANN. REV. SOC. 265 (1998); 
David Strang & Mary C. Still, In Search of the Élite: Revising a Model of 
Adaptive Emulation with Evidence From Benchmarking Teams, 13 INDUS. & 
CORP. CHANGE 309 (2004). 
 108. Suchman, supra note 99, at 128. 
 109. DAVID WILKINS, THE BLACK BAR: THE LEGACY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND THE FUTURE OF RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 
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practices,111 and a variety of other innovations. 
Correlatively, some seemingly beneficial innovations may meet 
with resistance and diffuse surprisingly slowly out of fears that the 
innovation will be considered illegitimate in some way. To illustrate, 
in a 1997 study, Gerald Davis and Henrich Greve compare the 
diffusion of two anti-takeover devices: poison pills and golden 
parachutes.112  They conclude that, despite the stronger economic 
case for golden parachutes as a mechanism for protecting 
shareholder interests, the poison pill diffused more quickly because 
boards feared that the parachute would be viewed as an illegitimate 
means of increased compensation.113  Similar concerns regarding 
lack of legitimacy may have contributed to elite law firms’ 
reluctance to embrace the LLP form. 
Particularly relevant for this Article is the recent study by 
Bruce Price of the diffusion of associate salary increases, first across 
Silicon Valley firms and then across the country, following the 61 
percent increase by Gunderson Dettmer Stough Villeneuve Franklin 
& Hachigian, LLP on December 21, 1999.114  Although attempts to 
compete for associates may have motivated the decision by some 
firms to match the Gunderson increase, the most commonly asserted 
rationale for the decision to follow Gunderson’s salary lead was that 
to fail to do so would send a negative signal to the marketplace that 
the firm in question was no longer a prestigious firm.115 
In fact, partners at many firms interviewed by Price expressed a 
belief that the decision was economically irrational for several 
reasons.116  First, neither partners, associates, nor clients at most 
firms desired an increase, as it meant reduced draws for partners, 
higher billing rates for clients, and higher billable hours for 
associates, in order to make up for the increased costs.117  Second, 
Gunderson was considered a relatively small firm doing work only 
 
(forthcoming 2005).  Wilkins interviews over a hundred African-American 
lawyers regarding their career trajectories. He concludes that one possible 
reason that hiring a token number of African-American associates originated at 
and then diffused among elite law firms, but not at other law firms, was that 
minority hiring was a mechanism for demonstrating high status.  Presumably, 
this was viewed as a cost that lower-tiered firms could not afford to incur. 
 110. See generally Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal 
Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOC. 405 (1999). 
 111. See generally Frank R. Dobbin et al., Equal Opportunity Law and the 
Construction of Internal Labor Markets, 99 AM. J. SOC. 396 (1993). 
 112. See generally Davis & Greve, supra note 98. 
 113. Id. at 34. 
 114. Price, supra note 97 (manuscript at 8). 
 115. Id. (manuscript at 26) (“[T]he most common reason given was that to 
not follow Gunderson and raise salaries, while their competitors did raise 
salaries, would signal the legal market that the firm was no longer a prestigious 
firm.”). 
 116. See, e.g., id. (quoting an interview subject’s statement that the salary 
increases reflected a “short run irrationality”). 
 117. Id. (manuscript at 28-29). 
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in Silicon Valley that could hire only ten to fifteen new associates 
per year.  Accordingly, it did not compete for associates with the 
majority of firms across the country that chose to match its salary 
increase and, in any event, could not have affected filling the 
thousands of slots that were affected by the move.118  As stated by 
one Gunderson partner, “We’re going to be taking 15 to 20 people 
out of the recruiting pool versus the thousands that are out there.  
I’m not sure why the other firms had to really match that other 
than, ‘We’re going to be the highest-paying law firm out there,’ you 
know?”119 
Interview subjects at other firms tended to agree that the salary 
increases were not driven by a need to compete for associates, but 
rather by a need to maintain an image as a top law firm.  Many 
interview subjects opined that the raises were “a matter of ego,”120 
an attempt “to save face,”121 and were motivated by notions that “if 
we are a top law firm we have to pay the same first year salaries as 
all of the other law firms in order to hold ourselves out as a top law 
firm.”122  One interview subject nicely summed up his firm’s decision 
to match the Gunderson raise as follows: “[A]lthough it didn’t make 
a lot of sense economically, from a perception point of view, we had 
relatively little option. You either matched the Gunderson raises 
and were considered a player[,] or you didn’t match them.”123 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Times of great regulatory, technological, or cultural change 
have always proven fruitful for the study of innovation and 
diffusion.124  With respect to organizational form, the advent of the 
LLP provides exactly this opportunity.  A careful analysis of the 
reactions of New York law firms to this changed environment casts 
doubt on some of the conventional theories regarding organizational 
form.  Specifically, the reactions of New York law firms to this 
innovation do not conform to the predictions of the signaling theory 
of partnership, at least as that theory is currently formulated. 
At the same time, the evidence indicates that signaling concerns 
did impact law firm choice of form.  The modifications to the 
signaling theory of organizational form proposed in this Article 
 
 118. Id. (manuscript at 27) (quoting a law firm partner’s statements that his 
firm matched the Gunderson increase, although they do not compete with 
Gunderson, because of a need to protect its market image as an elite firm that 
can pay the top salaries). 
 119. Id. (manuscript at 28) (quoting a Gunderson partner) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 120. Id. (manuscript at 23) (quoting a law firm partner). 
 121. Id. (manuscript at 26) (quoting a law firm partner). 
 122. Id. (manuscript at 25) (quoting a law firm partner). 
 123. Id. (manuscript at 23) (quoting a law firm partner). 
 124. Davis & Greve, supra note 98, at 8 (making this point, and arguing that 
the takeover wave of the 1980s provided such an opportunity). 
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render the theory both more theoretically plausible and more 
consistent with the behavior of law firms. 
In addition, this study provides insights for those interested in 
engendering, rather than simply studying, changes in the legal 
profession.  At times calls have been made for various reforms in the 
legal profession, including: a greater attention to ethical behavior, 
more accountability to government bodies or the public interest, a 
work environment that better balances the demands of work and 
family, and greater diversity in law firm hiring and promotion.  The 
reactions of law firms to New York’s LLP statute highlight the 
avenues by which such changes are likely to take hold and spread 
across the legal profession, if at all. 
This study suggests that law firms, particularly elite law firms, 
are risk averse and may initially resist even changes that seem to 
provide unqualified economic benefits when there is uncertainty 
regarding how clients and other relevant constituents will interpret 
the change.  At the same time, law firms appear willing to incur 
costs in order to convey a desired signal to the marketplace.  Finally, 
law firms (like other organizations) tend to mimic each other, paying 
particular attention to the actions of firms that are considered 
competitors for clients and status. 
The foregoing has implications for advocates of change within 
law firms and indicates that such efforts may be most fruitful if first 
focused on the relatively small group of elite firms that other firms 
consider high status and frequently attempt to emulate.  If these 
firms can be persuaded that being an early adopter of the innovation 
in question sends a credible signal that the firm is part of the 
high-status group, then the proposed reform may take root among 
elite firms (and, perhaps, those who aspire to be elite). 
For example, mentoring programs for minority associates or 
on-site child care facilities may be expensive to implement, even if 
they provide long-term benefits to the firm.  Accordingly, only the 
most profitable firms may be willing initially to incur this expense, 
and the adoption of such programs may become a signal that the 
adopting firm is a high earner.  As the innovation becomes more 
ingrained, however, lower-tiered firms may decide that the program 
is a badge of legitimacy that any “serious” firm should have.  As this 
happens, adoption of the innovation may trickle down to lower-
earning firms, until it finally diffuses across the bulk of the 
industry. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
QUESTIONS FOR GP PARTNERS 
 
1. Has your firm discussed becoming an LLP? 
 
2. What were the reasons asserted in favor of remaining a GP? 
 
3. What were the reasons (other than limited liability) asserted 
in favor of LLP? 
 
4. Was there an age division? 
 
a. I.e., did older partners favor the status quo more than 
younger ones? 
 
5. Do you think that you’ll eventually move to become an LLP? 
 
6. Was there any talk of redoing the partnership agreement to 
reflect higher profits for high-risk/high-return partners if you 
moved to LLP? 
 
7. Does your firm have a lock-step partner compensation 
structure? 
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APPENDIX B 
 
QUESTIONS FOR LLP PARTNERS 
 
1. Your firm didn’t take advantage of the LLP statute right 
away.  In fact it took you ___ years to make the LLP filing.  
What took so long? 
 
 OR 
 
2. Unlike many New York firms, your firm opted to become an 
LLP fairly quickly after the statute became effective.  Why 
was the choice so easy for you?  Why do you think other firms 
struggled with the decision and your firm did not? 
 
3. What were the primary arguments made against the LLP 
filing? 
 
a. Monitoring? 
b. Collegiality? 
c. Signaling? 
d. Intra-firm economics? 
e. Were there age differences in these arguments?  i.e. 
did older partners favor the traditional GP structure 
more than younger partners did? 
 
4. What were the factors that caused the arguments in favor of 
LLP to finally win out? 
 
5. Has your firm had any regrets about the choice to become an 
LLP? 
 
a. Has it altered your practice or relations with clients 
in any way? 
b. Has it altered relations among the partners in any 
way? 
c. Has it altered relations with your insurance company 
in any way? 
 
6. IF APPLICABLE – I notice that you filed at the same time as 
_____ [similar firms].  Was that a conscious decision?  Did 
their decision to file affect your decision in any way? 
 
7. Does your firm have a lock-step partnership structure? 
 
